Foreign Policy and Contemporary Relations between the Taliban and China, Qatar & Saudi Arabia

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“Because of Afghanistan’s placement in the centre of Asia, the knock-on effects of its past and current policies resonate beyond its own borders becoming regional and international concerns.” 1 

In 2021, after the twenty-year insurgency in Afghanistan, the Taliban, a fundamentalist group, returned to power. Following the withdrawal of the remaining U.S. troops, the Taliban began to impose increasingly harsh interpretations of Islamic law onto the nation, despite their pledges to respect the rights of ethnic groups practising alternative religions and women. The actions of this insurgent group have been described by Lindsay Maizland as “brutal and reminiscent of the actions in the 1990s”.2 On top of the self-made humanitarian crises that have been unfolding in recent years, the Taliban have inherited a war-torn country, bankrupted by sanctions and ravaged by climate change. Their foreign relations have been sorely affected by their actions and by analysing other nation’s interactions with the Taliban it is obvious that neighbouring countries endeavour to secure themselves against the capricious administration. 

China is seen to be taking the first significant steps in building relations with Afghanistan since they came to power, as China was the first to name a new ambassador in the country. Afghan officials have stated that this gesture will surely stimulate other nations to establish new relations with the Taliban-led government. A necessity for the Taliban as their current command over Afghanistan has not been officially recognised by any foreign governments (as the U.N. Security Council advised in June 2023).3 This is why Beijing has been careful not to signal this appointment as the formal recognition of the Taliban administration, though they have urged the international community to lead by example and begin a dialogue with the new government and encourage the Taliban to apply an inclusive political framework that adopts friendly external relations.4 

Alongside this, China is purportedly establishing discussions with Afghanistan with the aim of securing their border, whilst achieving national economic benefit. Following similar worries as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan about the Uyghur militants in the north, as “spillover” from cross-border terrorism is possible. Particularly after the Islamic State Khorasan bombed a Chinese-owned hotel in Kabul in December 2022.5 

Afghanistan’s location is vital to China’s geopolitical and regional interests which currently reflect Xi Jinping’s ambitious initiative to reinstate the ancient Silk Roads, to vivify global trade and strengthen international cooperation. Afghanistan offers China rich mineral resources and alongside invites to One Belt Road talks; the Taliban have been approached to discuss reinstating plans for a large copper mine in eastern Afghanistan. The acting Mining Minister, Shahabuddin Delawar, said he has met with a Chinese company to review the mining of rich lithium deposits – a possible $10 billion investment. Not only would China’s investments be economically positive for the Taliban administration but also for the nation as employment and infrastructure would also be developed in the surrounding areas. The Taliban surely welcome these investments in light of their ongoing economic dilemma.6 

In the face of a humanitarian crisis and the disdain of foreign powers, it’s understandable why the Taliban are hopeful for Chinese investments. However, China appears more apathetic as the Taliban are unlikely to offer any better investment deals than Pakistan nor is the country able to promise China a secure environment to invest in.7

Nevertheless, both sides seem content with how their relationship is developing, appearing to be a “win-win” formula as Afghanistan requires infrastructure and economic development, and China can present itself as an inclusive world power, implementing “soft power” interactions to integrate Afghanistan into regional economic and diplomatic cooperation.8 Though “marinated in mistrust” the bilateral ties are likely to continue to develop and are to date Kabul’s most significant relationship. 

In the Gulf Arab states the post-occupation of Afghanistan has set high stakes for potential international terror as the Taliban still struggle to subdue Islamic terrorist organisations in the north as they continue to exploit the country’s security vacuum. To decrease the mounting security stress the Gulf states are cautiously moving to normalise and partially recognise the Taliban regime, comparable to China. 

In the past three years, Qatar has adopted the position of mediator in central Asia, garnering both personal and international benefits for this station. They allowed Taliban militants to open a political office in Doha in 2013, an action that facilitated the intra-Afghan talks with Washington in March 2020, generating the Doha Agreement, promoting Qatar’s diplomatic credentials. The small Gulf monarchy has also kept its Kabul embassy open despite having no formal diplomatic ties with Afghanistan, though it represents U.S. interests. However, like China, Qatar continues to press for the international community to make a ‘roadmap’ for the Taliban, arguing that the isolation of the country further aggravates Central Asia’s fears around regional security.9 

In May 2023, the Qatari Prime Minister held talks with the Taliban. According to the Qatar News Agency outlet the meeting sought to convey “the country’s political role in communicating and facilitating relations with international immunity to achieve security and prosperity for the Afghan people.”10 By engaging, the Taliban are possibly submitting to international isolation and utilising the Qatari nation to service open dialogue, conceivable as Joe Biden was supposedly briefed on the talks. Despite the harsh sanctions employed by the country, the U.S. is purported to support this elevation in communication in the hope of a breakthrough to ease Afghanistan’s humanitarian and financial crises. Unfortunately, a former Afghan minister is reported to believe that Haibatullah Akhundzada, the supreme leader of Afghanistan, will not engage in serious dialogue with any other international powers until he has overcome the factional rivalries within Afghanistan. 

Overall, the meeting was a diplomatic success for Qatar and a hopeful sign that the nation will continue to promote positive relations in the future broadening the number of facilitators beyond Qatar (and Pakistan). 

In Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan is primarily viewed as a security and humanitarian concern. The Saudi-Afghan policy is centralised around security, especially since Saudi Arabia has pursued a semi-open anti-Taliban policy naturally distancing itself from the radical version of Islam practised by the Taliban. Consequently, the nation has remained highly reactive to ensure strategic priorities are fulfilled to protect themselves and their South Asian trade networks. By continuing to stay flexible in the face of the new Taliban administration Saudi Arabia is also able to somewhat shield Iran, their direct neighbour across the Persian Gulf, from Kabul to prevent building tensions within Islam.11 

Concerning the humanitarian crisis Saudi Arabia has found two footholds in Afghanistan to bolster itself, taking a ‘leading from behind’ approach by providing aid through the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) with the coordination of the Organisation of Islamic Operation (OIC). By providing relief for the country’s population, whilst remaining at arm’s length Saudi Arabia is buffering strained relations, announcing in 2022 a $30 million grant.12 The kingdom has offered Afghanistan aid of at least SR1 billion (over $200 million) over the past few decades for humanitarian, education, WASH (waters sanitation, and hygiene) and food security sectors.13 Regardless of this positive aid, the relationship remains frayed as the Taliban harbour bitter memories and Saudi Arabia are unwilling to direct funds into the administration because of the religious divergence, forcing the aid to be channelled through exterior foundations rather than by way of any institutional framework.14

Within Asia and on the international stage the Taliban are famed for inducing a multitude of humanitarian and political crises upon themselves. In response, neighbouring countries fear for their safety, tense because of Afghanistan’s turbulent past. China, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have enacted clever economic and political incentives to preserve their security from the volatile and unstable Taliban administration. 

References:

  1. Leonardo Jacobo Maria Mazzucco and Kristian P. Alexander, “Saudi Arabia and Qatar are cooperating with the Taliban. But their approaches to Afghanistan are different,” Atlantic Council, January 12, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/saudi-arabia-and-qatar-are-cooperating-with-the-taliban-but-their-approaches-to-afghanistan-are-different/  ↩︎
  2. Lindsay Maizland, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 19, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan  ↩︎
  3. Barbara Woodward, “While the Taliban continue on this path, international recognition will not be on the table: UK statement at U.N. Security Council,” GOV.UK, June 21, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeche https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/while-the-taliban-continue-on-this-path-international-recognition-will-not-be-on-the-table-uk-statement-at-un-security-council s/while-the-Taliban-continue-on-this-path-international-recognition-will-not-be-on-the-table-uk-statement-at-un-security-council  ↩︎
  4. Aljazeera, “Taliban gives a warm welcome to China’s new ambassador to Afghanistan,” September 13, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/13/taliban-gives-a-warm-welcome-to-chinas-new-ambassador-to-afghanistan ↩︎
  5. Dewey Sim, “Why China wants Taliban regime in Afghanistan to thrive,” South China Morning Post, October 26, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3239269/why-china-wantsTaliban-regime-Afghanistan-thrive  ↩︎
  6. Mohammad Yunus Yawar and Charlotte Greenfield, “Taliban to join China’s Belt and Road Forum, elevating ties,” Reuters, October 14, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taliban-join-chinas-belt-road-forum-elevating-ties-2023-10-14/  ↩︎
  7. Raffaello Pantucci, “China and the Taliban are friends in need of each other,” NIKKEI ASIA, September 15, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/China-and-the-Taliban-are-friends-in-need-of-each-other  ↩︎
  8. Dewey Sim, “Why China wants Taliban regime in Afghanistan to thrive,” South China Morning Post, October 26, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3239269/why-china-wants-taliban-regime-afghanistan-thrive  ↩︎
  9. Jonathan Landay, “Qatar prime minister, Taliban chief hold secret Afghan talks,” Reuters, May 31, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatar-prime-minister-taliban-chief-hold-secret-afghan-talks-source-2023-05-31/ ↩︎
  10. Aljazeera, “Taliban supreme leader, Qatari PM hold talks in Afghanistan,” May 31, 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/31/taliban-supreme-leader-qatari-pm-talks-held-in-kabul  ↩︎
  11. Guido Steinberg and Nils Woermer, “Saudi Arabia’s Interests in Afghanistan & Pakistan: Stakeholders or Spoilers – A Zero Sum Game?” CIDOB Policy Research Project, April 2013, https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/project_papers/stap_rp/policy_research_papers/exploring_iran_saudi_arabia_s_interests_in_afghanistan_pakistan_stakeholders_or_spoilers_a_zero_sum_game_part_1_saudi_arabia  ↩︎
  12. Saudi Fund for Development, “Saudi Arabia Provides a USD 30 Million Grant to Support the Afghanistan Humanitarian Trust Fund,” accessed October 31, 2023, https://www.sfd.gov.sa/en/n316  ↩︎
  13. Rashid Hassan, “Saudi Arabia provides $30m grant to support Afghan humanitarian fund,” Arab News, June 9, 2022, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2100196/saudi-arabia  ↩︎
  14. Mazzucco and Alexander, “Saudi Arabia and Qatar.”  ↩︎
Magnus Storvik

Magnus Storvik

Magnus is a Norwegian second year International Business student at the University of Edinburgh.